

BRIEF FOR GOC LOG COMD  
ON AN EXPERIMENTAL RIFLE USING L1A1 COMPONENTS  
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Background

1. The sequence of events has been as follows:
  - a. Oct 1969. Design and concept for a shortened weapon developed.
  - b. Sep 1970. Plans were drawn and submitted to the OC of the RMC Workshop Platoon.
  - c. 1971. After much opposition it became obvious that any attempts through official channels would be frustrated.
  - d. May 1971. It was only through the efforts of a girl-friend of a cadet than an interview with the Scientific Advisor was arranged. Because of dissatisfaction with the performance of the L1A1 in Viet Nam, the Scientific Advisor's Office was examining the feasibility of making an AK-47. The suggested modification using the L1A1 componentry appeared to be a convenient alternative solution.
  - e. Aug 1971. SAF Lithgow, under the supervision of the Department of Supply, completed a mock-up working model; designated the RMC No2 (Photo 1 & 2)
  - f. Oct 1971. RMC No2 was sent ADE for comments. The report, Flag A, was extremely negative. It compared the mockup working model, made for a cost of \$2,000 to two production finished weapons. The comparison was naturally unfavourable and the report implied that the inadequacies of the RMC No2 could not be corrected by further development. This report has had a lasting damaging effect on all future efforts to take this idea further despite a refutation of this report, Flag B, which pointed out the absurdity of the comparison and the report's general lack of objectivity. This refutation was apparently not well circulated.
  - g. Apr 1973. An unofficial trial was conducted at Jungle Training Centre (Battle Wing), Canungra. LtCol Bladen (SI, Battle Wing) was enthusiastic about this concept.
  - h. Feb 1974. Approval was given by the Comd 3 EME Gp to make another prototype at 3 Base Wksp Bn as an apprentice training project. Work commitments interfered significantly with the development and supervision of the project.
  - i. May 1974. DEME received a complaint from ADE that RAEME had "exceeded its charter". DEME called for the file on the rifle and saw only Flag A. A Warrant Officer was sent to 3 Base Wksp with orders to supervise the destruction of all parts and correspondence pertaining to the rifle. This was prevented by placing the rifle, now in a semi-completed state, on unit charge. Because the project was ended prematurely, the rifle, designated the KAL1, was not suitable for live firing as many of the "bugs" had not been eliminated. The KAL1 definitely illustrates however that the problems in the EDE criticism can easily be overcome; especially in the areas of:
    - (1) weight,
    - (2) stripping, (See Photos 3, 4, 5, and 6)
  - j. Jun 1974. A brief paper explaining the development was written, Flag C, however, Col Allen, Comd 3 EME Gp was not happy with the presentation and said he would assist with the production of a glossy foldered report which would

aid the presentation of the idea. Col Allen resigned and the report did not eventuate. The paper was not widely distributed.

- k. Jul 1974. Flag C was sent to the Army Suggestion Committee. The idea was referred to ADE who rejected it without even calling for the second prototype. I was awarded \$10.00 as a prize. (Flag D)
- l. Feb 1975. SASR conducted a brief trial on the RMC No2 as the KAL1 was inoperable. The report, Flag F, was favourable. The RMC No2 has now fired well over 10,000 rounds. (In one afternoon alone, 2,000 rounds were fired at SAF to demonstrate the rifle to visiting Engineering Class from RMC.) The rifle most probably requires a new barrel. In particular, the SASR report makes mention of the balance of the weapon and its ability to be fired instinctively. The KAL1 illustrates that the weight can be greatly reduced. (Photo 6)

### Conclusion

2. Since 1969, there have been significant developments overseas, Flag G, all of which incorporate features that I have advocating and serve to reinforce the validity of my assertions.

3. It is my opinion that we do have the ability to build a small arms family ideally suited for our Army and the conditions it shall encounter in this country. The chief obstacle appears to be the ADE report and the personalities at ADE (now renamed EDE).

### Recommendations

4. It is recommended that the whole concept be reappraised by an independent authority and the two prototypes be evaluated in their true context, that is, that they are crude mock-ups made on low budgets with a great deal of improvisation and are only illustrations of a concept.

5. It is also important that I am able to freely communicate my ideas and concepts to this independent body.



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